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"When America sneezes, the rest ofthe world
catches pneumonia"-so went the favorite cliche
of the 1940's and 1950's. Now, with the fast-
growing influence of foreign nations upon the
American economy, the metaphor may have to
be revised somewhat, along the lines recently
suggested by Tilford Gaines-"When the rest of
the world has the sniffles, the U.S. may get them
too." But although the international financial
system has shown itselfsusceptible to a wide va-
rietyofeconomic iUs, it has also demonstrated an
ability to develop antibodies to fight off disease,
in the form of new methods ofanalysis and new
forms of cooperation and regulation. This issue
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of the Economic Review analyzes the new dis-
eases-andcorrespondingcures-thathave aris-
en in the risk-infested world of the 1970's, with
special reference to their on the oper-
ations of multinational banks and multinational
corporations.
In the first article, Hang-Sheng Cheng con-
siders the impact of the heavy commercial-bank
financing ofpayments deficits on the stability of
both the U.s. banking system and the interna-
tional financial community. Within several
years' time, the world has experienced an abrupt
and large increase in world payment imbalances,
a rapid accumulation ofexternal debt by non-oildeveloping nations, and a substantially enhanced
commercial-bank role in financing those imbal-
ances. Moreover, most analysts expect that this
situation will continuefor some time to come.
Cheng reviews the pessimistic discussion of
thesubjectfound in Congressional testimony and
the press, and asks ifthe system is as inherently
unstable as alleged. Judging from a recent Inter-
national Monetary Fund study of balance-of-
payments adjustments, he claims that the pessi-
mistic argument is overdrawn. "Balance-of-pay-
ments developments and debt accumulation
should be viewed in the context ofa growing but
inflation-prone world economy. When proper ac-
count is taken ofoutput, trade and price changes,
the world economy has been more successful in
approaching financial stability than is generally
realized."
Cheng finds little evidence to support the ar-
gument that balance-of-payments loans are inap-
propriate for banks. Instead he claims that the
two-way capital flows between international
banks and borrowing countries provide evidence
of world-wide financial intermediation, which
supports the world economy's efficiency of re-
source allocation. In particular, he notes the role
played by banks as the consequence of a major
shift ofinternational payments-fromtheearlier
build-up ofpayments surpluses by industrial na-
tions to the present build-up of surpluses by
OPEC nations and offsetting debt accumulation
by less-developed countries (LDC's). Since the
OPEC nations place a large portion oftheir sur-
pluses with commercial banks, the latter play an
important part in recycling such funds through
theworld economy.
Following on Cheng's argument, Nicholas
Sargen notes that major international banks
strongly discount the possibility of widespread
defaults or rescheduling of developing-country
loans. A more likely situation would be occasion-
al repayment difficulties requiring refinancing or
rescheduling. From the lending banks' stand-
point, then, the crucial problem is to detect in ad-
vance which countries are likely to experience
repayment difficulties and when these difficul-
ties mayarise.
More information and improved analytical
techniques thus are necessary to detect potential
default or rescheduling situations. Sargen finds
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many existing procedures wanting in this regard,
anddiscusses ways ofimproving country-riskap-
praisal through the use ofseveral types of eco-
nomic indicators. "Banks should focus on the
inflation rate (and its determinants) and the
debt-service ratio as the key economic variables
affecting a country's borrowings and its ability to
repay."
Sargen distinguishes between "liquidity" re-
schedulings, which are associated with the
bunching ofshort-term commercial credits, and
other rescheduling:>, which are identified with
long-term debt· relief on official credits. Mone-
tary (and fiscal) factors appear to be closely in-
volved in the "liquidity" cases. Inflation and
overvalued exchange rates lead to export stagna-
tion and over-importing-=and thence to exces-
sive relianceon foreign borrowing and frequently
to foreign-exchange crises. He argues, 'however,
that cases of chronic-debt relief-for example,
Ghana and India in the mid-1960's-are less
amenable to a monetary framework of analysis.
Henotes the difficulty ofmeasuring the extent of
overvaluation on the basis of inflation-rate dif-
ferentials, because in these cases ofchronic-debt
relief, governments tend to resort to price con-
trols, capital controls, exchange controls, and
high tariffbarriers.
Official regulators as wen as commercial-
bank analysts must cooperate in maintaining the
health ofthe international financial community,
according to Robert Johnston in a third article.
He notes that banks have established a good re-
cord ofinternational operations through diversi-
fication, improved information systems, and
appropriate internal controls. "However, banks'
collective risk assessment may still result in a
banking system that is too risky from the view-
point ofsociety, and the function ofbanking su-
pervision is to keep risk exposure within
acceptable boundaries. Foreign risk, to the ex-
tent it affects the stability ofthe domestic bank-
ing system, makes supervision of international
bankingnecessary."
Johnston argues that there are important dis-
tinctions between the types of risk involved-
banking risk and sovereign risk. Banking risk is
essentiallythesameat homeand abroad. Despite
greater potential difficulties in obtaining infor-
mation on foreign borrowers, the credit factorsinvolved are fundamentally the same as in do-
mestic lending. Sovereign risk is a different mat-
ter, for which there is no exact domestic
counterpart. Actually, there are few cases where
countries refuse to repay (or refuse permission
for their citizens to repay) foreign loans, because
borrowing countries don't want to foreclose the
possibility ofobtaining foreign credit again in the
future. Rather, the real problem cases are those
where countries get into balance-of-payments
difficulties which force them to reschedule debt.
Johnston emphasizes that banks have been
successful in reducing their loss exposure, judg-
ing by the relatively low losses they have exper-
ienced in their foreign operations. But to the
extent that official international lending repre-
sents a form ofinsurance, banks may tend to take
greater risks, and international supervision must
act to counteract that tendency. "At the same
time, this emphasis upon risk-taking should not
interfere with the ability of U.S. banks to func-
tion as international lenders. Indeed, efforts to
improve international-banking supervision must
ultimately be judged by their contribution to the
world as well as the U.S. bankingsystem."
John H. Makin follows by analyzing the im-
pactofa specific domestic action-thenow-fam-
ous FASB-8-upon the operations of multi-
national corporations. Statement No.8 ofthe Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board was de-
signed to standardize procedures for reporting
foreign-currency positions of U.S. multination-
als. FASB-8 prompted a storm of protest from
many of these firms, which argued that it would
cause violent swings in earnings unrelated to
their basic economic condition, and hence would
penalize their share prices and increase their
costs ofraising capital. But some analysts retort-
ed that investors should be expected to "see
through" reported earnings figures to distinguish
between those fluctuations which reflect "funda-
mentals"and those which don't.
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Makin's analysis represents a pioneer effort to
measurestatisticallythe impact ofFASB-8 upon
share prices of multinationals. He notes that
FASB-8 standards were super-imposed upon a
system of quasi-floating exchange rates which
permitted various degrees ofexchange-rate flexi-
bility, selectively since August 1971 and more
widely since March 1973. For multinationals,
such flexibility meant increased variability ofthe
dollarvalue offoreign-currency items on balance
sheets and income statements, with possibly in-
creased variability of net earnings. This fact
should have been fully appreciated by investors
well before FASB-8 went into effect in January
1976. It was thus necessary to look for possible
effects offloating perseon costs ofequity capital
for multinationals, and then see ifany additional
effects could be attributedto FASB-8.
Makin concludes that the application of
FASB-mandated accounting standards pro-
duced few unanticipated effects on earnings-
and thus on shareprices-of typicalmultination-
al firms such as the oils, drugs and chemicals.
The performance ofsuch groupings was general-
ly indistinguishable from that ofa control group
ofdomestic firms-whether in the face of float-
ing rates, anticipation of FASB-8, or actual ap-
plication of that new standard. However, the
performance of a group of companies whose
earnings areespecially sensitive to exchange-rate
risk was adversely affected. "Our results suggest
that earnings reports which resulted from appli-
cation of FASB-8 did provide new information
which helped investors distinguish between mul-
tinational groupings regarding the impact of ex-
change-rate adjustments upon (actual and
expected) volatility of reported net dollar earn-
ings. The new standards are significant, then, not
so much because of their specific form but be-
cause they apply a single standard toall multina-
tionals, and thereby enable the market to judge
more accurately the relative importance of firms
within the overall multinationalgrouping."